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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Rey Alfredo Ornelas appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of four counts of lewd conduct and three counts of 
sexual battery, contending the state violated his right, and a juror's right, to equal 
protection in exercising one of its peremptory challenges and that the district 
court erred in denying his request to excuse three jurors for cause. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Based on allegations that Ornelas committed sexual offenses against five 
separate victims, the state charged him with five counts of lewd conduct, three 
counts of sexual abuse of a child under sixteen, and two counts of sexual battery. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp.9-12, 23-28, 125-130.) Ornelas pled not guilty and the case 
proceeded to trial during which the court declared a mistrial after one of the 
victims testified about an incident of sexual misconduct the state did not disclose. 
(R., Vol. 1, pp.38, 102-124; Tr., Vol. I, 11/15/2011, p.378, L.22-p.387, L.3.) 
At the conclusion of the second trial, the jury found Ornelas guilty of four 
counts of lewd conduct and three counts of sexual abuse, but acquitted him of 
the two counts of sexual battery and one of the lewd conduct charges. (R., Vol. 
2, pp.245-55; Tr., Vol. II, 12/8/2011, p.771, L.16 - p.774, L.17.) The court 
imposed unified 25-year sentences with 15 years fixed on all four lewd conduct 
convictions and unified 15-year sentences with 10 years fixed on the three sexual 
abuse convictions and ordered that all sentences run concurrent. (R., Vol. 2, 
pp.279-281.) Ornelas filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., Vol. 2, pp.284-87.) 
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ISSUES 
Ornelas states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the state violate Mr. Ornelas' and Juror Number 24's rights 
to equal protection when it used its peremptory challenges to 
only strike men from the jury and deliberately removed Juror 
Number 24 because he was male? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion and deny Mr. Ornelas 
his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the 
United States Constitution and his Article 1, Sections 7 and 13 
rights under the Idaho Constitution to a trial before a fair and 
impartial jury when it refused to excused biased jurors for 
cause? 
(Appellant's Brief, pA.) 
The state rephrases the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Ornelas met his burden of demonstrating that the district court 
clearly erred in finding the state did not purposefully discriminate against Juror 
No. 24 since the prosecutor offered reasons for excusing him in addition to his 
gender? 
2. Has Ornelas failed to establish constitutional or reversible error as 




Juror No. 24 Was Not Excused Solely Because Of His Gender 
A. Introduction 
Following the exercise of peremptory challenges, the state contended 
Ornelas committed a violation pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986), by using 11 of his 12 peremptory challenges to strike female jurors. (Tr., 
Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.228, Ls.11-14.) Ornelas provided a gender-neutral 
explanation for his peremptories and raised a Batson claim against the state 
based on the fact that the prosecutor struck only men. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, 
p.230, Ls.10-12.) In response, the prosecutor admitted using her "tenth preempt 
... in an effort to try to get a female on the panel" since all of the jurors "in front 
of [defense counsel]" were men "as a result of the defense's striking." (Tr., Vol. 
II, 12/5/2011, p.231, Ls.17-21.) With respect to that juror, Juror No. 24, the 
prosecutor subsequently reiterated striking him because she was "trying to get 
another female" and because "he is young" and the prosecutor had "concerns 
with regards to life experiences." (Tr., Vol. 11,12/5/2011, p.234, Ls.12-16.) The 
prosecutor further noted "concerns because he has a small child, but not 
necessarily a child of the age of the victims," which resulted in "concerns with 
regards to him relating." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.234, Ls.18-19.) The state 
declined the court's offer to "start all over" with jury selection and, ultimately, the 
court concluded that, "[b]ased upon the record," it could not "make afinding that 
either party purposefully ... discriminated based on gender." (Tr., Vol. II, 
12/5/2011, p.233, Ls.19-22, p.235, Ls.14-16.) The court also noted "there is a 
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substantial female influence on this jury, even with just four out of the fourteen, 
and so we're going to proceed with this jury." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.235, 
Ls.20-22.) 
Ornelas contends the state violated his and Juror No. 24's rights by 
deliberately removing him from the jury based on his gender and that the district 
court abused its discretion by finding the state did not act in a discriminatory 
manner when it excluded Juror No. 24. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-12.) 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's finding regarding "the validity of the state's explanation for 
exercising peremptory challenges on minority jurors" is reviewed on appeal for 
clear error. State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82,86,856 P.2d 872,876 (1993). "[T]he 
trial court's finding with regard to the state's explanation will be overturned on 
appeal only if it is clearly erroneous in light of the facts as a whole." State v. 
Owen, 129 Idaho 920, 933, 935 P.2d 183, 196 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Araiza, 124 
Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877). 
C. Juror No. 24 Was Not Excused Solely Because Of His Gender 
After the parties exercised their peremptory challenges, the prosecutor 
raised a Batson challenge based on the fact that Ornelas used 11 of his 12 
peremptories to exclude women. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.228, Ls.11-14.) The 
prosecutor argued that, based on these numbers, she made a "prima facia [sic] 
showing of discrimination pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment." (Tr., Vol. II, 
12/5/2011, p.228, Ls.20-23.) Defense counsel explained: 
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· .. I can go through each one of them if the court would like and 
explain it. But I looked for individuals that had prior family members 
or themselves had been sexually abused in the past. And I looked 
at individuals that worked in social services. I know there was a 
social worker that I excused and an individual that was involved in 
counseling of individuals that had been sexually abused. My belief 
is that those individuals have a bias, whether or not it was enough 
for them to step forward, but they would have a bias against the 
defendant and in favor of the state and the victims. 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.229, Ls.7-1S.) Defense counsel further explained that 
he excused one juror because he did not feel he had "enough information" that 
the juror "could be fair in the case" and he felt the juror was trying to "hide their 
true feelings in the case." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.229, L.19 - p.230, L.S.) 
Finally, defense counsel noted, "I don't know if the state challenged or struck any 
women at all." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.230, Ls.11-12.) When the court asked 
the state if all six of its peremptory challenges 1 were used to strike men, the 
prosecutor said, "Judge, they were." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.230, Ls.21-23.) 
Then, as part of her argument in support of her Batson challenge against 
Ornelas, the prosecutor stated: 
I can indicate to the court that my tenth preempt was done in 
an effort to try to get a female on the panel because every -- pretty 
much every female [sic] in front of him was males [sic] as a result of 
the defense's striking. And I just think the whole purpose of Batson 
is to get a fair and impartial jury that is reflective of the community, 
and that there are no challenges, no gender specific reasons or 
Fourteenth Amendment specific reasons for the strikes. 
(Tr., Vol. 11,12/5/2011, p.231, Ls.17-25.) 
1 The state waived six of its peremptory challenges. (Tr., Vol. II, p.230, LS.17-
22.) 
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The court denied the state's Batson challenge, noting there were "four 
females on this jury panel of fourteen" (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.232, Ls.23-24) 
and finding: 
The defense has indicated that the reasons or grounds for 
eliminated or his use of peremptory challenges has been largely on 
a female that is a counselor and has counseled other victims of 
sexual abuse, and some of the other females have indicated prior 
sexual abuse. 
Although it is eleven to one, I guess it's not all twelve that he 
exercised female [sic] against. I can't find for the record that there's 
been purposeful discrimination, and I'm going to deny the Batson 
challenge. 
(Tr., Vol. 11,12/5/2011, p.232, Ls.2-12). 
Defense counsel responded with his own Batson challenge, arguing: "All 
of the state's exercised preempts were against males. The state even indicated 
on the record that the last preempt was with the intent to obtain another male 
[sic] on the jury paneL" (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.233, Ls.13-18.) Because both 
parties made a Batson challenge, the court inquired whether they wanted to "just 
throw in the cards and start all over." (Tr., Vol. II. 12/5/2011, p.233, Ls.19-21.) 
The prosecutor said, "No" (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.233, L.22), and then went on 
to explain: 
Judge, I'll just simply indicate for the record the person in 
position 1, Juror No. 99, was struck. He made some statements 
with regards to proof, and state [sic] was concerned he was going 
to hold the state to a higher standard. 
With regards to Juror No.6, he is -- has no children. I note 
that he is not married. The state had concerns with regards to him 
relating to these particular children. Juror number -- I'm sorry. That 
was 220. Juror No.9, or 374, made some statements with regards 
to holding -- requiring the state to present certain evidence whether 
it existed or not, so the state had concerns with regards to him. 
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The state challenged Juror No. 24, part of the reason was 
because we were trying to get another female on, but part of the 
reason was also because he is young. The state had concerns 
with regards to his life experiences. The state also had concerns 
because he has a small child, but not necessarily a child of the age 
of the victims, so the state had concerns with regards to him 
relating. 
Juror No. 33 exercised extreme disdain for the state. It was 
very clear that he did not want to be here, and he continued to 
scowl every time I would go to ask him a question, so the state did 
not believe that he would be a fair and impartial juror. 
And juror No.1, was in the 35 spot, does not have children. 
The state had concerns with regards to his ability to relate to 
children as they testify. 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.233, L.24 - p.235, L.3.) 
The court ruled: 
Based upon the record before the court the court cannot 
make a finding that either party purposefully has discriminated 
based on gender, and, therefore, we're going to proceed. 
The court is denying the Batson. challenge of both parties. 
We will proceed. I am satisfied that there is a substantial female 
influence on this jury, even with just four out of the fourteen, and so 
we're going to proceed with this jury. 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.235, Ls.14-22.) 
Ornelas contends the state violated his and Juror No. 24's rights under 
Batson by deliberately removing him from the jury based on his gender and that 
the district court abused its discretion by finding the state did not act in a 
discriminatory manner when it excluded Juror No. 24. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-
12.) 
In Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, the United States Supreme Court held that, 
U[a]lthough a prosecutor ordinarily is entitled to exercise permitted peremptory 
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challenges for any reason at all, as long as that reason is related to his view 
concerning the outcome of the case," "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the 
prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race .... " 
(Internal citations and quotations omitted.) The Supreme Court later extended 
Batson to prohibit the exclusion of jurors based on gender, holding: 
[TJhe Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination in jury 
selection on the basis of gender, or on the assumption that an 
individual will be biased in a particular case for no reason other 
than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or happens to 
be a man. As with race, the "core guarantee of equal protection, 
ensuring citizens that their State will not discriminate ... , would be 
meaningless were we to approve the exclusion of jurors on the 
basis of such assumptions, which arise solely from the jurors' 
[gender1·" 
J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994) (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98) 
(ellipses and second alteration original). 
The standard for establishing a claim based on gender-discrimination is 
the same as that required for a race-based claim. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 144. First, 
the "party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of 
intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to 
explain the basis for the strike." ~ at 144-45. (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 97). 
"The burden then shifts to the State to produce a race-neutral or gender-neutral 
explanation, related to the case to be tried, for challenging the prospective juror." 
State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 227 P.3d 933 (Ct. App. 2010) (citing Batson, 
476 U.S. at 97-98 and Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877). "It is not 
enough for the prosecutor to represent that he or she did not exercise its 
challenges on an impermissible basis; the State must provide a clear and 
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reasonably specific explanation of legitimate reasons for exercising the 
challenges." ~ In cases of alleged gender discrimination, the explanation must 
be "based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and it may not be merely 
pretextua!." Erickson, 148 Idaho at 687, 227 P.3d at 941 (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. 
at 145). 
After the state offers its explanation, the trial court must "determine 
whether the State's explanation has overcome the inference of purposeful 
discrimination established by the defendant's prima facie showing." Erickson, 
148 Idaho at 687,227 P.3d at 941 (citing J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145.) "In deciding if 
the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available," Erickson, 148 Idaho at 687, 227 P.3d at 941 (citations and quotations 
omitted). The fact that a jury is ultimately "gender-balanced" is irrelevant to the 
Batson inquiry - "the correct query is whether the State engaged in purposeful 
discrimination, not whether it succeeded in obtaining an unbalanced pane!." 
Erickson, 148 Idaho at 687,227 P.3d at 941. "The trial court's finding with regard 
to the state's explanation will be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous in light of the facts as a whole." State v. Foster, 152 Idaho 88, 92, 266 
P.3d 1193, 1197 (Ct. App. 2011). The deference afforded to the district court's 
determination reflects an understanding that the "district court is in a better 
position than [the appellate court] to determine the motivation of the state in 
challenging a juror." ~ at 92, 266 P.3d at 1197 (citation omitted); see also 
Araiza, 124 Idaho at 87, 856 P.2d at 877 ("since the trial judge's findings in the 
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context of consideration here will largely turn on evaluation of credibility, a 
reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference") (citations, 
quotations, and alteration omitted); Alverio v.Sam's Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 
F.3d 933 (yth Cir. 2001) ("Once the trial judge has been persuaded of the 
neutrality of the reason for striking a juror, we have no basis for reversal on 
appeal unless the reason is completely outlandish or there is other evidence 
which demonstrated its falsity.") (citations, quotations and ellipses omitted). 
When confronted with Ornelas' Batson challenge, the prosecutor indicated 
she did not strike Juror No. 24 solely based on gender, claiming his age and 
concerns regarding his "life experiences" and ability to relate to children "the age 
of the victims" were also factors in her decision. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.234, 
Ls.12-19.) "[W]here a party gives multiple reasons for striking a juror, it is not 
enough for the other side to assert that the empaneled juror shares on attribute 
with the struck juror." Alverio, 253 F.3d at 941 (citation omitted). 
Having heard the prosecutor's explanations, the court found there was no 
purposeful discrimination based on gender and denied Ornelas' Batson 
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challenge.2 (Tr., Vol. /I. 12/5/2011, p.235, Ls.14-17.) This finding should be 
reversed only if this Court concludes it is clearly erroneous. 
/I. 
Ornelas Has Failed To Show His Rights To A Fair And Impartial JUry Or Due 
Process Were Violated As A Result Of The Denial Of Three Of His Motions To 
Excuse For Cause 
A. Introduction 
Ornelas contends the district court abused its discretion and denied him 
his right to an impartial jury and to due process by "refus[ing] to excuse three 
biased jurors for cause." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) Specifically, Ornelas 
complains about the district court's refusal to excuse Juror Nos. 13(167),32(78), 
and 34(684). (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-25.) Of these jurors, only Juror No. 
13(167) was ultimately seated on the jury. (See Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.242, 
L.17 - p.244 , L.7 (roll call).) Because Jurors Nos. 32(78) and 34(684) did not sit 
on Ornelas' jury, his claim of error in relation to them fails. With respect to Juror 
No. 13(167), Ornelas has failed to establish the juror was biased. 
2 The court also noted it was "satisfied that there is a substantial female influence 
on this jury, even with just four out of the fourteen." (Tr., Vol. /I, 12/5/2011, 
p.235, Ls.19-21.) The prosecutor made a similar comment in the context of her 
Batson challenge against Ornelas when she asserted that "the whole purpose of 
Batson is to get a fair and impartial jury that is reflective of the community." (Tr., 
Vol. /I, p.231, Ls.21-23.) The state concedes that whether the jury has a 
"substantial female influence" or is "reflective of the community" is irrelevant for 
purposes of a Batson analysis. The only relevant question under Batson is 
whether the parties have engaged in purposeful discrimination. Erickson, 148 
Idaho at 687, 227 P.3d at 941 ("the correct query is whether the State engaged in 
purposeful discrimination, not whether it succeeded in obtaining an unbalanced 
panel"). The "Sixth Amendment right to a jury representative of a fair cross-
section of the community applies only to the jury pool-not to the petit jury." 
United States v. Prince, 647 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2011). 
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B. Standard Of Review 
"The determination whether a juror can render a fair and impartial verdict 
is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed 
absent a showing of abuse of discretion." State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, 609, 
150 P.3d 296, 302 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). IWhen the appellate court 
reviews a discretionary decision, it conducts a multi-tiered inquiry considering 
whether the district court (1) correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) 
acted within the bounds of that discretion, and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason. 
C. Ornelas Has Failed To Show Reversible Error In The District Court's 
Failure To Exclude Juror Nos. 32(78), 34(684), Or 13(167) For Cause 
Ornelas claims he was deprived of his right to a fair and impartial jury 
because the district court denied three of his requests to excuse jurors "for 
cause." (Appellant's Brief, pp.13-30.) Specifically, Ornelas claims error in the 
failure to excuse the following jurors: 13(67), 34(684), and 32(79). (Id.) As an 
initial matter, and as noted by Ornelas, there is confusion in the record regarding 
juror numbers. 3 (Appellant's Brief, p.2 n.2.) In general, however, it appears the 
court minutes from voir dire use both the juror's seat number and the actual 
number assigned to the prospective juror, assuming the prospective jurors were 
assigned seat numbers in the order of selection. (Compare R., Vol. 2, pp.162-
164 with Tr., Vol. II, 12/2/2011, p.57, LS.6-17 Guror numbers selected) and Tr., 
Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.67, Ls.2-13 (clarifying that "Prospective Juror No.2" was 132 
3 One example of such confusion, reminiscent of an Abbott & Costello routine, is 
reflected in the colloquy found at Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.69, L.23 - p. 71, L.10. 
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and "Prospective Juror No. 42" "used to be 164); but see Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, 
p.66, L.24 - p.67, L.1 ("Prospective Juror No.1" indicating prior number was 
99).) Thus, for example, where the court minutes refer to "Juror #43 (119)" -
"#43" apparently refers to the seat number and "(119)" apparently refers to the 
juror number. (See Tr., Vol. II, p.12/2/2011, p.57, LS.6-16 Guror 119 is the 43rd 
juror selected).) The voir dire transcript, however, generally refers to the juror 
only by seat number, although there are some exceptions. (See,~, Tr., Vol. II, 
12/5/2011, p.67, Ls.4-13 (noting Prospective Juror Nos. 2 and 42 "were" 132 and 
164); but see p.21, L.13 - p.22, L.7 (referring to Prospective Juror No. 165, which 
is not a seat number as only 80 jurors were selected).) To add to the confusion, 
when the jurors are actually seated and the roll is called, the jurors are referred to 
using only their original numbers, not the seat numbers used during voir dire. 
(Tr., Vol. II, p.242, L.15 - p.244, L.7.) On appeal, Ornelas refers to the jurors as 
they are referred to in the court minutes - using both the seat number and the 
parenthetical juror number. To avoid further confusion, the state will do the 
same. 
During voir dire, Ornelas challenged several jurors "for cause." (Tr., Vol. 
11,12/5/2011, pp.148-151, 165-171, 179-182,188-191,202-203,209-215,216-
220", 222-223.) The court granted Ornelas' motion with respect to several jurors, 
but denied his requests as to Juror Nos. 13(167), 32(78), and 34(684). (Id.) 
Ornelas contends the court's failure to excuse these jurors for cause constitutes 
an abuse of discretion and a constitutional violation. Because Juror Nos. 32(78) 
and 34(684) were otherwise excused, Ornelas' claim of error in relation to those 
13 
jurors fails. Ornelas' claim of error in relation to Juror No. 13(167) also fails 
because application of the law to the facts shows Ornelas is incorrect in his 
assertion that Juror No. 13(167) was biased. 
1. Because Juror Nos. 32(78) And 34(684) Were Not Seated On The 
JUry, Ornelas Is Not Entitled To Relief On The Grounds That The 
District Court Denied His Requests To Excuse Them For Cause 
Although the district court denied Ornelas' requests to excuse Juror Nos. 
32(78) and 34(684) for cause, both jurors were otherwise excused, presumably 
as a result of Ornelas using two of his 12 peremptory challenges to excuse 
them.4 Because neither juror was ultimately seated, Ornelas' claim of 
constitutional error fails. 
In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81,85 (1988), the United States Supreme 
Court considered the "Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment implications of the trial 
court's failure to remove [a challenged juror] for cause and [the defendant's] 
subsequent use of a peremptory challenge to strike [the juror]." The Court 
rejected the claim that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is 
violated under such circumstances because removal of a juror pursuant to a 
4 Because the peremptory challenges were exercised off the record, there is no 
indication in either the transcript or the court minutes which jurors Ornelas 
excused by way of a peremptory strike. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.227, Ls.6-16; 
R., Vol. 2, p.164; see also Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.229, L.7 - 230, L.8 (defense 
counsel discussing reasons for striking jurors but not identifying jurors by 
number).) Nevertheless, based on the process used and what can be discerned 
from the jurors stricken pursuant to the state's peremptory challenges, which are 
reflected in the context of the state's response to Ornelas' Batson challenge (Tr., 
Vol. II, 12/5/2011 Tr., p.233, L.24 - p.235, L.1), it is probably fair to assume that 
Ornelas used two of his peremptory challenges to excuse Juror Nos. 32(78) and 
34(684). 
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peremptory is "as effective[ ] as if the trial court had excused [the juror] for 
cause." 19.:. at 85-86. The Court reasoned: 
Petitioner was undoubtedly required to exercise a 
peremptory challenge to cure the trial court's error. But we reject 
the notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a 
violation of the constitutional right to an impartial jury. We have 
long recognized that peremptory challenges are not of 
constitutional dimension. They are a means to achieve the end of 
an impartial jury. So long as the jury that sits is impartial, the fact 
that the defendant had to use a peremptory challenge to achieve 
that result does not mean the Sixth Amendment was violated. We 
conclude that no violation of a petitioner's right to an impartial jury 
occurred. 
Ross, 487 U.S. at 88 (citations omitted). 
The Court also rejected the argument that a defendant suffers a due 
process violation when he uses a peremptory strike to excuse a juror that should 
have been excused for cause. "Because peremptory challenges are a creature 
of statute and are not required by the Constitution, it is for the State to determine 
the number of peremptory challenges allowed and to define their purpose and 
the manner of their exercise." Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. "As such, the 'right' to 
peremptory challenges is 'denied or impaired' only if the defendant does not 
receive that which state law provides." 19.:. In Ross' case, because "he received 
all that Oklahoma law allowed him" in terms of peremptory challenges, his due 
process claim failed. 19.:. at 90. 
In Idaho non-capital cases, a party is only entitled to six peremptory 
challenges. I.C. § 19-2016. The district court allowed Ornelas to exercise 12 
peremptory challenges. (See Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.230, Ls.13-16.) As in 
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Ross, because Ornelas received "all that [Idaho} law allowed him," and then 
some, his due process claim fails. 
Also consistent with Ross, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that use of a 
peremptory challenge to strike a juror the defendant contends should have been 
excused for cause does not constitute reversible error. State v. Ramos, 119 
Idaho 568, 808 P.2d 1313 (1991) (citing State v. Wozniak, 94 Idaho 312, 486 
P.2d 1025 (1971), Ross, 487 U.S. 81). The Court recently reiterated this 
principle in Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54, 256 P.3d 755, 761-62 
(2011). 
Ornelas acknowledges the holdings in Ramos and Nightengale but 
contends it is "nonsensical" to require a defendant to "roll[ } the die and leave the 
biased juror on the petit jury in hopes of creating reversible error or waste one of 
his peremptory challenges to cure the district court's erroneously [sic} ruling." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Ornleas further contends this should "not be the 
requirement in Idaho" because, he argues, "[t]he remedy created by the appellate 
courts to correct erroneous decision [sic} by district court judges encourages 
practitioners to sandbag this issue and not mitigate the problem." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.21.) In support of his argument, Ornelas relies on "several recent 
opinions chastising defense counsel for 'sandbagging' an issue before the district 
court in an attempt to gain a reversal on appeal." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) 
Ornelas' anti-sandbagging argument lacks merit and he has otherwise failed to 
articulate any basis for overruling recent Idaho Supreme Court precedent or 
interpreting a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury any 
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differently than that right has been interpreted by the United States Supreme 
Court. 
The sandbagging concern referenced by Ornelas was identified as a 
relevant consideration in the context of fundamental error. In State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (201 0), the Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
Generally Idaho's appel/ate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial. This limitation on 
appellate-court authority serves to induce the timely raising of 
claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court the opportunity to 
consider and resolve them. Ordinarily, the trial court is in the best 
position to determine the relevant facts and to adjudicate the 
dispute. In the case of an actual or invited procedural error, the trial 
court can often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot 
possibly affect the ultimate outcome. Furthermore, requiring a 
contemporaneous objection prevents the litigant from sandbagging 
the court, i.e., remaining silent about his objection and belatedly 
raising the error only if the case does not conclude in his favor. 
(Quotations, citations, and brackets omitted.) 
Thus, the Court sought to deter counsel from (as opposed to chastising 
counsel for) not objecting to a perceived error at a time when it could be resolved 
by the trial court and instead raising it on appeal - a forum less weI/-suited to 
address and remedy the alleged error. The sandbagging concern does not 
translate here because Ornelas is complaining about the legal "requirement" that 
he "mitigate" the court's alleged error, not the decision whether to object in the 
first instance, which is what the sandbagging concern addresses. Moreover, 
unlike other errors that an attorney mayor may not choose to object to, the 
attorney has the ultimate power to prevent seating a biased juror and can thereby 
override the district court's decision. TJI\is is precisely the point of the Supreme 
Court's statement in Ross that removal of a juror pursuant to a peremptory is "as 
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effective[ ] as if the trial court had excused [the juror] for cause." 487 U.S. at 85-
86. 
Like Ornelas, the appellant in Nightengale sought to overrule Ramos. 151 
Idaho at 354, 256 P.3d at 762. The Court rejected that request, noting Ramos 
"follows the general weight of authority on the issue, holding that an error in 
refusing to grant a challenge for cause is grounds for reversal only if the 
defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced 
upon him." 1.9.:. (citations and quotations omitted). 
Idaho jurisprudence requires respect for its own precedent. The rule of 
stare decisis dictates that controlling precedent be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or unless 
overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy 
continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 (2002); 
State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) (quoting 
Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 983 (1990)); 
see also State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 1001, 842 P.2d 660, 680 (1992) 
("[P]rior decisions of this Court should govern unless they are manifestly wrong 
or have proven over time to be unjust or unwise."); State v. Odiaga, 125 Idaho 
384, 388, 871 P.2d 801, 805 (1994) ("Having previously decided this question, 
and being presented with no new basis upon which to consider the issue, [the 
Court is] guided by the principle of stare decisis to adhere to the law as 
expressed in [its] earlier opinions."); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 440-52, 825 
P.2d 1081, 1096-1108 (1991) (McDevitt, J., specially concurring). 
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Other than his sandbagging argument, Ornelas has failed to offer any 
justification for departing from controlling precedent on this issue. His request, 
like Nightengale's request, should therefore be rejected. 
2. Ornelas Has Failed To Show Juror 13(167) Was Biased 
During voir dire, defense counsel asked Juror No. 13(167) if he would be 
"torn between" wanting to "err on the side of the child here" and his "duty as a 
juror and a citizen" to require the state to "prove the crime to this leveL" (Tr., Vol. 
11,12/5/2011, p.164, L.22 - p.165, L.14.) Juror No. 13(167) responded: 
I think I would struggle with not erring on the side of the child being 
a parent of daughters, and also I work with children. I think it would 
be difficult for me. I think if I had a doubt I would probably err on 
the side of the child versus the defendant because of how I feel 
regarding children. 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.165, Ls.15-20.) 
Defense counsel then engaged Juror No. 13(167) in the following 
exchange: 
Q: Like I said, I think that's a natural inclination for people. 
Now, because of your duty as a citizen and the responsibility 
for sitting as a juror do you think you would be able to follow the 
court's instructions and set that aside even though you have that 
predisposition? 
A: I would be willing to try, but it would be difficult. 
Q: Okay. If you were -- if you were sitting in the defendant's 
chair, would you want you to sit in this case? 
A: Probably not. It's hard. You know, I kind of feel like the 
last juror that had this problem, too. If it was a different nature 
case, I think I could be a fair juror. The nature of this case it's 
difficult. And I know it's difficult for everyone in the room. So it's a 
hard thing. It's just hard content. It's hard as a parent to think of 
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children having to go through anything like difficult like that. It 
would be horrifying. And so just listening to the evidence I think 
would be difficult for me. Not that it wouldn't be for everyone else 
either. I know that it would be. 
Q: In fairness everybody in here is different. Other people, 
you know, for whatever reason they may not feel that strongly 
about it--
A: Sure. 
Q: -- as you may feel. And I can't kind of read whether or 
not that bias exists anymore than the state or the judge. 
A: Sure. 
Q: We have to rely on you to be able to identify that for us. 
So based on what you said is it something where you don't believe 
you can be a fair juror in this case? 
A: I think it would be difficult. 
Q: Okay. And, you know, I guess I wanted to see if I'd get a 
yes or no from you. In other words, if you get selected for this jury, 
and you go back into the jury room, and it turns out, you know what, 
it's too difficult, that's a problem for the system. And so, you know, 
it's kind of one of those where certainly it's easier for us if you kind 
of say, look, I can't be fair in this case versus, yes, I'm telling you I'll 
be fair. 
A: You know, it's hard to know until you're in that situation. 
You know, I just keep going through in my mind that -- you know, I 
don't know -- for somebody to be convicted of such a crime and not 
be guilty would be horrible. But for a child -- for someone who is 
guilty to not be declared guilty, they're victimized again, and so that 
would be really difficult for me to have to decide between the two. 
If there was a little bit of doubt, like I said, I think I would err 
on the side of the child because that's where my heart is because I 
would feel so badly for a child to be victimized again by the court 
perhaps failing the child. 
Q: Okay. What do you mean by if there was a little bit of 
doubt? I think the judge will instruct you that everything is subject 
to some doubt. I mean, you heard the analogy, well, how do I know 
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an alien didn't come down and take this guy's form and do it, and 
now we're convicting this guy, and it was an alien that did it. 
So everything -- the law takes the position that everything is 
subject to some doubt. But you have to get to that position of 
giving the defendant the benefit of the doubt and the state proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you think you can do that? 
A: I think it would be very difficult for me to do that. 
Q: Okay. So in fairness to you if it came to the position of, 
look, I think he might have did it, but I'm not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt, I'm still going to find him guilty? 
A: Perhaps. Sorry. I know you want yes, no. 
(Tr., VoL II, 12/5/2011, p.165, L.21-p.168, L.22.) 
Following the foregoing exchange, Ornelas moved to exclude Juror No. 
13(167) for cause. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.168, Ls.23-24.) The prosecutor 
accepted the court's invitation for further inquiry and told Juror No. 13(167) the 
court would instruct him that, if there is reasonable doubt, he must find the 
defendant not guilty and asked Juror No. 13(167) whether he could "follow the 
court's instruction." (Tr., Vol. 11,12/5/2011, p.169, Ls.6-11.) Juror No. 13(167) 
answered: "I think so. It would just depend on -- how to define reasonable doubt 
and how much doubt -- you know, it's hard to know." (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, 
p.169, Ls.12-14.) The prosecutor followed-up, asking Juror No. 13(167) whether 
an instruction explaining reasonable doubt would assist him. (Tr., Vol. II, 
12/5/2011, p.169, Ls.18-22.) Juror No. 13(167) agreed that "would be helpful." 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.169, L.23.) When next asked if he could find Ornelas 
not guilty if the court instructed him on what reasonable doubt is, and if 
reasonable doubt existed, Juror No. 13(167) responded: "I think so." (Tr., Vol. II, 
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12/5/2011, p.169, L.24 - p.170, L.3.) Based on her discussion with Juror No. 
13(167), the prosecutor "challenge[d] the defense's challenge," and the court 
denied Ornelas' request to excuse Juror No. 13(167) for cause. (Tr., VoL II, 
12/5/2011, p.170, LsA-7.) After that, defense counsel and Juror No. 13(167) had 
the following discussion: 
Q: Juror No. 13, so it puts pressure on you if it came to the 
point when it's time to judge this case if you came to the position 
within yourself that, you know what, I know I can't be fair in this 
case. Do you think you would have the ability, I guess the self-
conviction to say I need to talk to the judge or, bailiff, can I talk to 
the judge-
A: Yes. 
Q: -- and bring that to the court's attention? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And the goal is, you understand, that the system can 
only work if people say, look, I'm not going to be judging this one 
outside of what's required by law. 
In other words, if the law says I have to be beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and I'm thinking he probably did it but not 
beyond a reasonable doubt, I'm still going to convict him, then 
you've got to take some step to notify the court that I can't adhere 
to that jury instruction. Do you understand that? 
A: I do understand. 
(Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.170, L.12-p.171, L.8.) 
Given that Juror No. 13(167) was selected to serve on the petit jury, unlike 
Juror Nos. 32(78) and 34(684), Ornelas did not elect to use one of his 12 
peremptory challenges to exclude him. (Tr., Vol. II, 12/5/2011, p.243, Ls.17-18.) 
Ornelas "recognizes that because [Juror No. 13(167)] indicated that it [sic] 
could follow the court's instructions, the juror may have been rehabilitated and, 
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therefore, counsel is not raising the issue that the biased juror sat on the jury like 
the facts established in Hauser.,,5 (Appellant's Brief, p.25 n.7.) Instead, Ornelas 
argues that if "the Court continues with the status of the law" requiring him to 
"demonstrate that he exercised all of his peremptory challenges and an 
incompetent juror was forced upon him," he has met that burden because, he 
contends, Juror No. 13(167) "was biased as a matter of fact" since, according to 
Ornelas, Juror No. 13(167) "candidly admitted that they [sic] would tend to 
believe the State's witnesses over the defendant, despite the evidence." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.22, 24.) It is unclear how Ornelas can assert that he is not 
claiming "that the biased juror sat on the jury like the facts established in Hauser' 
and, at the same time, contend he is entitled to relief because a "partial juror was 
forced upon him." Notwithstanding Ornelas' distinction, the central question 
seems to be whether Juror No. 13(167) was biased. If he was, he should have 
been excused for cause. If he was not, Ornelas was not deprived of his right to a 
fair and impartial jury. The district court correctly rejected Ornelas' request to 
excuse Juror No. 13(167) for cause. 
While Juror No. 13(167) undoubtedly expressed concern that the case 
would be difficult for him given the nature of the allegations and the involvement 
of children, he ultimately indicated a belief that he could follow the court's 
instructions and, if there was reasonable doubt, find Ornelas not guilty. Juror No. 
5 In Hauser, the Court of Appeals concluded that "when a juror admits bias, and 
gives no unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several 
efforts by the court or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an inference that he 
will not act with entire impartiality becomes inescapable." 143 Idaho at 610, 150 
P.3d at 303. 
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13(167) also unequivocally stated that if, during the course of trial, he concluded 
he could not be fair, he would bring it to the court's attention. As noted in 
Hauser, "disqualification is not necessarily required by every venire person who, 
at some point during voir dire, expresses bias toward a party. Although not 
always dispositive, the court is entitled to rely on assurances from venire persons 
concerning partiality or bias." 143 Idaho at 609, 150 P.3d at 302 (citation and 
quotations omitted). 
Because the voir dire of Juror No. 13(167) ultimately revealed he could be 
impartial and, if not, he would advise the court accordingly, Ornelas has failed to 
establish a "partial juror was forced upon him." 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdicts finding Ornelas guilty of four counts of lewd conduct and 
three counts of sexual abuse. 
DATED this 29th day of May, 2013. 
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